THE TERM OF OFFICE OF A JUDGE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UKRAINE AS A GUARANTEE OF INDEPENDENCE: THE NATIONAL MODEL AND EUROPEAN STANDARDS

Abstract

The article addresses the problem of termination of the powers of judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine as a determinant of the institutional capacity of constitutional justice and the protection of human rights. It substantiates that the term of office of a Constitutional Court judge is not merely a temporal parameter of the mandate but a constitutional guarantee of independence intended to ensure the stability of judicial status and the autonomy of legal positions. The study reveals an asymmetry in the current regulation: the grounds for early termination are defined in detail, whereas the mechanism for the completion of a mandate, the relevant time limits, and the legal consequences of delayed appointment of a new judge remain fragmented and internally inconsistent. This generates legal uncertainty, creates preconditions for quorum crises, and may paralyse constitutional adjudication, thereby undermining the constitutional complaint as an effective domestic remedy.

The research employs formal-legal, systemic, and comparative methods to compare the national model with European standards that combine a fixed, non-renewable term with safeguards ensuring the continuity of the court’s functioning (staggered rotation, procedural certainty as to the end of the mandate, and clear appointment deadlines). It is demonstrated that under martial law the loss of the Court’s operational capacity is particularly dangerous, as it weakens checks and balances and increases the risk of excessive or disproportionate restrictions on rights and freedoms.

The article proposes avenues for improving Ukrainian legislation: normative consolidation of procedures for completing the mandate and guarantees of continuity in exercising constitutional jurisdiction; introduction of mandatory deadlines for appointing judges and legal consequences for their breach; implementation of staggered rotation of the Court’s composition; and strengthening the human-rights orientation of the Constitutional Court’s activity. The scientific novelty lies in a comprehensive substantiation of the link between кадрові (personnel) procedures and the continuity of constitutional review. Implementing the proposed approaches would enhance procedural predictability, minimise quorum crises, and strengthen trust in constitutional oversight.

Keywords: rule of law; martial law; Venice Commission; European standards; constitutional justice; Constitutional Court of Ukraine; Constitutional Court judge; term of office; expiry of powers; early termination; quorum; continuity of the court’s functioning; constitutional complaint.